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We conducted an incentivized lab experiment examining the effect of gain vs. loss-
framed warning messages on online security behavior. We measured the probability
of suffering a cyberattack during the experiment as the result of five specific security
behaviors: choosing a safe connection, providing minimum information during the
sign-up process, choosing a strong password, choosing a trusted vendor, and logging-
out. A loss-framed message led to more secure behavior during the experiment. The
experiment also measured the effect of trusting beliefs and cybersecurity knowledge.
Trusting beliefs had a negative effect on security behavior, while cybersecurity
knowledge had a positive effect.
Keywords: cyber security, gain vs. loss frame, prospect theory, lab experiment, online behavior, nudge, threat
assessment
INTRODUCTION
One of the many benefits of the digital transformation of markets is the ability for consumers
to access a wide variety of stores and products from any device that connects to the Internet.
However, this implies a growth in the complexity of consumer vulnerabilities, often exceeding
regulatory efforts (Kucuk, 2016). Chief among these is cybercrime, a growing trend. The proportion
of malicious URLs increased from 1 in 20 in 2016 to 1 in 13 in 2017 (SYMANTEC, 2018). In
addition, threats in the use of mobile technology increased by 54 percent in 2017, compared to
2016, probably due to the rising use of these devices to access the Internet.
In order to remain secure online, consumers need to preserve their data confidentiality and
integrity. They have to make cybersecurity decisions, respond to security-related messages and
make adjustments to security-related settings that are not always easily understood (Payne and
Edwards, 2008). Many consumers display limited cybersecurity knowledge and skills, despite
having daily access to the Internet (Bennett et al., 2008; Bennett and Maton, 2010). Few are fully
aware of the consequences of their online behavior, few see their behavior as risky and many fail to
follow the recommendations and advice on safety given to them. All of which means that people
end up behaving unsafely online, making them vulnerable to cyberattacks.
Such behavioral vulnerability means that people are often the weakest link in the cybersecurity
chain (Sasse et al., 2001), which makes them a target. In 2017, 41% of ransomware attacks
were against consumers (SYMANTEC, 2018); therefore, a better understanding of users’ security
behavior is relevant to tackling the problem of cybersecurity (Yan et al., 2018).
There are many actions consumers could take to increase their online security, including:
running and updating antivirus software; using firewalls; not trusting in odd emails from unknown
sources (Anderson and Agarwal, 2010); using strong passwords; logging out from sites; using
trusted and secure connections, sites and services; providing the minimum amount of personal
information needed; and being aware of physical surroundings (Coventry et al., 2014). Yet
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campaigns and training initiatives aimed at promoting such
behaviors are often unsuccessful (Bada et al., 2019) and people
generally ignore warnings (Junger et al., 2017), so more is being
done to see how behavioral “nudges” might be designed to
improve secure behavior and decision-making more directly.
To date a significant body of research has addressed behavioral
issues in cybersecurity. For example, recent studies have shown
that message framing can affect online shopping decisions
(Cheng et al., 2014; Jin et al., 2017) and that privacy priming
and security framing can generate safer decision-making around
app selection (Chong et al., 2018) or change security incident
reporting (Briggs et al., 2017). However, a significant issue
with much of this previous research is that it has focused
on perceptions of privacy and security risks (Miyazaki and
Fernandez, 2001) or has over-relied upon self-reported past
behaviors (Milne et al., 2009), or stated behavioral intentions
(Anderson and Agarwal, 2010). This paper goes a step further
and measures observed behavior. This is important, as studies of
observed behavior drawn from both psychology and behavioral
economics show human decision-making to be both flawed and
biased. In part, this is because people are economic in their
thinking and avoid processing details explicitly in order to make
greater use of their automatic thinking and intuition (Milkman
et al., 2009). By investigating actual consumer behaviors, we can
understand more about the way such biases impact cybersecurity
decision-making.
The present study contributes to a larger research initiative
exploring the potential of behavioral insights to improving
security behavior. It tests the effectiveness of two similar warning
messages, designed to encourage consumers to behave more
securely while shopping online, on a range of cybersecurity
behaviors. In order to measure these behaviors, we created
a lab environment designed to mimic the online shopping
experience and provided them with a financial endowment to
spend. We then gave participants either a message that focused
on the positive outcomes resulting from behaving securely (i.e.,
a message that framed their behavior in terms of financial
gain) or a message focused on negative outcomes resulting
from not behaving securely (i.e., a message that framed their
behavior in terms of financial loss). Critically, our messages
reflected an actual financial gain or loss to the consumer.
This is important to avoid adverse effects generated by giving
supplemental warning messages that are not properly integrated
into the task (Junger et al., 2017).
The rest of this article is structured as follows: section
“Literature and Hypotheses” presents the literature review on
framing effects and the hypotheses. Section “Materials and
Methods” describes the methodology and the experimental
procedure; section “Results” presents the results; and section
“Conclusion” offers some conclusions.
LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESES
Individuals will react differently depending on how information
is presented to them. In particular, when asked to choose
between two options with the same expected value, people will
be influenced by whether the outcome is framed as a gain (e.g.,
likelihood of winning) or as a loss (e.g., likelihood of losing). The
frame does not alter the communicated content – it just presents
it differently (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981; Druckman, 2001).
In their seminal work, Tversky and Kahneman (1981)
presented experimental subjects with two options. One offered
a certain outcome and the other offers an uncertain (i.e., risky)
outcome. Both options had the same expected value (i.e., utility x
probability). Options were framed in terms of gains or in terms of
losses. Subjects tended to prefer the option of a certain (i.e., non-
risky) gain over a risky gain. Conversely, they preferred options
with an uncertain (i.e., risky) loss over a certain loss. In other
words, people tend to avoid risks when facing the prospect of
gains, but will seek risks to avoid prospective losses.
Loss aversion, or negativity bias, suggests people assign
stronger values to negative feelings than to positive ones
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Rothman and Salovey, 1997). The
impact and sensitivity of negative information, therefore, will be
higher (Cacioppo et al., 1997; Baumann et al., 2019). For example,
individuals display more distress when thinking about losing an
amount of money, than the enthusiasm they exhibit for winning
the same amount (McGraw et al., 2010). It follows that people will
be more motivated to avoid losses than to pursue a gain of equal
value (Rozin and Royzman, 2001; Vaish et al., 2008).
When an element of risk is introduced, the framing effect is
more nuanced. In particular, in the gain frame, the risky prospect
of having some losses is undesirable compared to the certain
option of not having any losses. In the loss frame, the certain
prospect of having some losses is undesirable compared to a
risky prospect which could avoid losses altogether. Hence, in
the gain frame people seek certainty and in the loss frame they
accept risk (Zhang et al., 2017). In behavior change interventions,
therefore, when individuals face a decision that involves a risk
of obtaining an unpleasant outcome (e.g., cancer screening),
loss-framed messages should be more effective. On the other
hand, when the perceived risk of the unpleasant outcome
is low, or when the outcome is pleasant (e.g., engaging in
physical activity), a gain-framed message should work better
(Rothman et al., 2006).
However, what can be expected of gain- and loss-framed
messages in behavior change interventions more generally, where
the element of risk is not present? The literature is ambiguous in
this regard. On the one hand, interventions using a loss frame
should be more effective in generating behavior change, simply
because “losses loom larger than gains,” as described above (see
e.g., Hong et al., 2015). However, a number of sources in the
literature argue that gain framing can also be effective as a longer-
term intervention. In a meta-analysis of 93 disease prevention
studies, gain-framed appeals were more persuasive than loss-
framed appeals, although the difference was quite small and
attributable to success in gain-framed messages promoting dental
hygiene (O’Keefe and Jensen, 2008). Other sources report no
significant differences overall, e.g., O’Keefe and Nan (2012) in a
meta-analysis of vaccination behavior.
Other factors can mediate subjects’ response to a framed
message, such as the level of involvement with the issue,
perceived self-efficacy, cultural background, the level of riskiness
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of the behavior itself, and socio-demographics (Maheswaran and
Meyers-Levy, 1990; Banks et al., 1995; Rothman et al., 1999;
Millar and Millar, 2000; Meyers-Levy and Maheswaran, 2004;
Uskul et al., 2009; Lim and Noh, 2017). For example, in exploring
the effects of interventions to reduce alcohol consumption, gain
framed messages were more effective with those with low issue
involvement, but loss-framed messages were found to be more
effective in those with high issue involvement (de Graaf et al.,
2015). In our own study, we ensured high issue involvement by
making final payoff to the participants contingent upon their
cybersecurity behavior and would therefore expect to see some
cybersecurity benefits from a loss-framed message.
The Cybersecurity Context
Translating these findings to the cybersecurity context, we can
see that to date, no studies have measured the direct behavioral
impacts of a gain or loss framed cybersecurity message, although
we can find one study that captures the advice a participant
would offer to a fictional friend, following a gain-framed or loss-
framed cybersecurity incident. Specifically, Rosoff et al. (2013)
conducted a study in which people were presented with a
set of scenarios in which they had fictional “prior experience”
of a cybersecurity problem and were then asked to “advise a
friend” as to the right action to take. Gain and loss framed
messages were used to describe the potential outcome of a risky
cyber choice with the gain-framed messages endorsing the safe,
protective behaviors and the loss-framed messages warning of
the consequences of risky action. For example, in a scenario
about downloading music, the gain frame explained the actions
to take for the friend to avoid the risk of acquiring a virus
whereas the loss-frame highlighted the risk of them acquiring a
virus. The authors found that the more the focus was on loss,
the more likely participants were to make safer cybersecurity
decisions. From this limited evidence of loss vs gain framing
in the cybersecurity context, then, it would seem that losses do
indeed loom larger than gains.
In our experiment, building upon the example above, we
assume a loss-framed security message should be more effective
in ensuring secure online behavior than a gain-framed message.
We can also assume that, as the financial losses are real in our
own paradigm, participants have high level of involvement, which
would also contribute to loss-framing’s effect. Based on these
insights, we postulate the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1: The group exposed to the loss-framed message
will show more secure online behavior than the group exposed to
the gain-framed message.
We also consider other factors that could mediate the effect
of the interventions tested. Trust is essential in the e-commerce
environment as the process of buying online entails some risks,
such as sharing personal information with an unknown seller. As
a multidimensional construct, it refers to integrity, benevolence
and predictability among other factors (McKnight et al., 2002;
Gefen et al., 2003). Lack of trust toward an e-commerce seller
may prevent users from buying online (Jarvenpaa et al., 1999;
Grabner-Kräuter and Kaluscha, 2003; Gefen and Heart, 2006),
conversely, trusting the vendor may facilitate online purchasing
(McCole et al., 2010). This begs the question as to whether
trust can lead to more reckless online behavior. It is an
interesting issue and one which suggests an extension of the
typical trust relationship in which vendor trust is a gateway to
online purchasing. Here we ask whether vendor trust lead to
riskier behavior all round. We would expect this to be the case,
considering the antecedents of trust as discussed by Patrick et al.
(2005), who point out how important trust is as a facilitator
of social engineering attacks such as phishing, where familiarity
with logos and trade names can lead consumers to erroneously
place trust an online message. In this study, we wanted to assess
whether trust in an online vendor can similarly create a “trust
trap,” effectively inducing a false sense of security that leads to
a reduction of cybersecurity behaviors. Hence, we postulate that
subjects who are more trusting will behave less securely as they
may have confidence on vendor’s goodwill and will not take the
necessary steps to protect themselves. We measure trusting beliefs
combining the scale developed by McKnight et al. (2002) and
the one by Jarvenpaa et al. (1999). It provided a high internal
consistency (α = 0.93).
Hypothesis 2: Participants who exhibit higher levels of trust
toward the vendor will show less secure online behavior than
participants who exhibit lower levels of trust.
We also included a measure in our model related to
cybersecurity knowledge, measured by asking our participants
to assess a range of security-related behaviors (i.e., providing
minimum information, connecting to a trusted site, logging
out, etc. – see for example Coventry et al., 2014). We asked
participants to rate the behaviors they thought could prevent
them from suffering a cyberattack, using a 5-point Likert scale
(1 = It won’t reduce my risk at all; 5 = It will reduce my risk
extremely). Internal consistency was tested through Cronbach’s
alpha and gave a high reliability of the scale (α = 0.90). We
expected higher levels of cybersecurity knowledge would lead to
more secure behavior, either directly or through increased self-
esteem (see e.g., Tang and Baker, 2016). Note that cybersecurity
knowledge was only measured in the post-purchase questionnaire
to avoid participants being primed with this information during
the experiment. We proposed the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: Participants with a high level of cybersecurity
knowledge will display more secure online behavior than
participants with a lower level of knowledge.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Experimental Procedure
We conducted a laboratory experiment with 120 participants,
60 per treatment1. The target population consisted of internet
users who had purchased at least a product or a service
online in the last 12 months. The participants were selected
following a quota design for the sample of both treatments.
The quotas were obtained from Eurostat’s Annual Survey of
Access and Usage of ICT in Households and Individuals 2013,
1This sample was extracted from a larger study with 600 participants testing the
effect of different warning messages on security behavior (Rodríguez-Priego and
van Bavel, 2016).
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which established that internet users who purchased a good
or service online in the previous 12 months in Spain were
51.7% men and that 40.6% of the Internet users were under
35 years of age. The sample was obtained from the subject
pool managed by the laboratory of experimental economics
of the ERI-CES (University of Valencia) with more than
25,000 volunteers. The recruitment system of the lab opened
a call on its web page, only visible to those participants
already registered in the database. Participants had to be
actual members of the target population and answered filter
questions to confirm this point. They were randomly assigned
to experimental treatments until the representative quotas for
age and gender were completed in each treatment. After that,
no more participants of the age group or gender whose quota
had been reached were allowed to register for the experiment.
Ethical approval was granted by the Experimental Research
Ethics Commission of the ERI-CES. Subjects were invited to the
experimental laboratory and randomly assigned to a computer
station. At the end of the experimental session, they received
an anonymous payment in an enveloped identified only by the
number of their station.
During the experiment, participants were asked to make
several shopping decisions and were assigned an amount of
money (an endowment). The incentive for participating in the
experiment was divided in two. They received a fixed show-
up fee for participating in the experiment and a variable
fee that depended on the decisions they made during the
online shopping process and on the random event of suffering
a cyberattack. Subjects were told that they could receive a
random cyberattack during the experiment. To increase the
ecological validity of the experiment and to establish a decision
environment similar to real-world Internet use, subjects were
informed that the probability of being attacked would depend
on the level of security of their online behavior. No specific
information on which decisions actually increased or reduced this
security level was provided to them. The use of performance-
related incentives was relevant in this context to simulate
the risks they might take when going online. In the lab, it
is not possible to introduce a virus in their computer or
make them feel the threat of a cyber-attack, since participants
are not using their own computer. Specifically, the fact of
suffering the random cyberattack would damage them by
reducing their variable payoff at the end of the experiment.
Consequently, if they behaved unsafely during the experiment,
they could suffer a simulated cyberattack, and they would earn
less money. On the contrary, if the behaved safely during the
experiment, the probability of suffering a cyberattack would be
the lowest and they would receive more money. This mechanism
generated an incentive that is aligned with those in real-life
situations: subjects aim to reduce the probability of suffering a
random cyberattack.
After reading the instructions, and before the shopping
experience began, participants filled a questionnaire with
sociodemographic items. At the end of the purchase
process, they completed a second questionnaire. It included
questions related to trust in the e-commerce provider and
cybersecurity knowledge.
In the experiment, participants had to buy a real product
(a desktop wallpaper). They also had to make several security
decisions, although – as mentioned earlier – they were not
explicitly told about the potential consequences of each of these
decisions. The intention was to let them behave as they would
do in a non-experimental environment, where no feedback on
security performance is available.
At the end of the experiment, participants had to
answer a second questionnaire. After this post-experimental
questionnaire, we provided participants with information on
their accumulated probability of suffering a cyberattack due to
their navigation. A random process then determined if they
suffered the cyberattack or not (based on the above-mentioned
probabilities). If they suffered the cyberattack, they would lose
part of their variable endowment.
Experimental Conditions
We assigned participants to one of two experimental conditions
showing different security messages. The experimental
conditions presented a message focusing on the possible
positive (i.e., gain-framed) and negative (i.e., loss-framed)
outcomes related to their security behavior. Before they had
to make any security-related decision, a message appeared as
a pop-up in the center of the screen. Participants had to close
the pop-up window to continue with the experiment. Then, the
message moved to the upper part of the screen. The gain-framed
message stated, “Navigate safely. If you do, you could win de
maximum final endowment.” The loss-framed message stated,
“Navigate safely. If you don’t, you could lose part of your final
endowment.”
The Dependent Variables
Probability of Suffering a Cyberattack
The first behavioral outcome measure in this study, taken from
van Bavel et al. (2019), was the probability of suffering a
cyberattack at the end of the experiment, which would reduce
participants’ variable payment. The probability was in the range
of 5 to 65% and was calculated as a product of the five security
decisions made during the experiment. From this minimum
value of five percent, the selection of an unsecured connection,
a non-trusted vendor or not logging out added 12 percentage
points each to the probability of suffering a cyberattack. The sign-
up process added another 24 percentage points in total. Lack
of strength in the selected password added anywhere from zero
percentage points (if the password met all seven six security
criteria) to 12 points (if it met none). The non-compulsory
information provided added between zero (if none of the items
were answered) to 12 points (if subjects answered provided
all of the items).
The probability of suffering the attack worked as an effective
outcome measure of the security level of decisions made by the
subjects: if they always proceeded in the most secure way this
probability was kept at its minimum value (5%). On the other
hand, if they selected the riskiest option at each step of the
experiment, the probability reached its maximum value (65%).
The maximum probability was set at a higher value than what
could be expected when navigating well-known e-commerce
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sites in the real world. This was done to maintain a wide
range of variation in the outcome measure. In addition, since
participants did not actually know this value, it had no impact
on their online behavior. Finally, although the probability of
suffering a cyberattack was not related to the actual chances of
suffering a cyberattack outside the experiment, the decisions that
determined the probability were based on good security behavior
in the real world (Coventry et al., 2014). This lack of prior
information on how this variable is measured provided more
ecological validity to the experiment. In real online purchases,
consumers do not know in which percentage each of their
actions is contributing to an increase in their probability of
suffering a cyberattack.
Cybersecure Behavior
The second behavioral outcome measure was computed as the
mean of the five security-related decisions that participants
had to make during the experiment, described in more
detail below: choosing a secure connection, choosing a strong
password, providing minimum information in the sign-up
process, choosing a trusted vendor and logging-out.
The decisions of choosing a secure connection, choosing a
trusted vendor and logging-out were binary. The strength of the
chosen password depended on seven rules that follow the usual
parameters (Keith et al., 2007). Providing minimum information
on the sign-up process meant completing as few of the eight
optional cells requesting personal information. More information
on these decisions is provided in the following subsection.
Consequently, the variable cybersecure_behavior was computed
as in Eq. (1).
Cybersecurity_behaviour =
connection+ password7 +
sign−up
8 + vendor+ log− out
5
(1)
Security-Related Decisions
During the experiment, participants had to make five security-
related decisions, which represented actions that users should
take to protect themselves from cyberattacks (Coventry et al.,
2014). We focused on decisions related to online purchasing
processes that could be tested in an experiment. Participants had
to make the decisions sequentially as follows:
Decision 1: Choosing a Secure Connection
The first action participants had to make was to connect to
the experimental intranet. This was in fact a simulated intranet,
with the only aim to examine participants′ security decisions.
They had two options: they could choose to connect to the
intranet through a secure or an unsecured connection. The
secure connection forced the participants to wait 60 s and type
a password provided on the screen. The purpose was to force
them to make an extra effort if they wanted to behave securely.
The next screen displayed a processing bar that charged during
the connection process. Below the bar, participants could see
a button that allowed them to change to an unsecured but
immediate connection if they did not want to wait the entire
minute. This possibility would let participants to change their
mind, as in the real world.
The unsecured connection was an instant connection to the
simulated intranet. Participants did not have to wait – the
connection time was 0 s and it did not require any password.
However, by choosing this option, participants increased their
probability of suffering a cyberattack. The objective was to
highlight the often intricate process that behaving safely online
entails (as opposed to behaving unsafely). Choosing a secure
option reflected the compliance budget that users weigh to
make a decision (Beautement et al., 2009). The options (secure
vs. unsecured) appeared randomly on the left or right-hand
side of the screen to avoid location having an effect on
participants’ decisions.
After connecting to the intranet, participants could see the
e-commerce website. It displayed the mock company name and
logo, and a link to the terms and conditions. The link contained
information about how the data would be managed, used and
stored; the rights of the user; and copyright information. All
this information complied with the European Data Protection
Directive 95/46/EC. Participants had to accept the terms and
conditions during the sign-up process by clicking the button “I
agree to the Terms and Conditions”.
The homepage was the gate for the subjects to start choosing
products. When a subject clicked on a product, a detailed page for
that product opened. On this page, the subject could click on the
“buy” button to continue with the shopping process, or could go
back to see any other products offered.
Decision 2: Choosing a Strong Password
Online consumers can prevent unauthorized individuals to
exploit their password by creating a long password (Keith et al.,
2007), or combining numbers and special characters with letters.
During the experiment, once subjects decided which product
to buy, they had to register by creating a username and
a password. We measured the level of password strength
according to seven common security parameters, which included
a minimum number of characters, lower case characters, upper
case characters, numeric digit characters, and special characters,
and a Boolean check whether password contained the username
or email. Each of the seven criteria would increase the probability
of suffering a cyberattack if not met.
Decision 3: Providing Minimum Information in the
Sign-up Process
During the registration process, after choosing the username
and password, participants were asked to provide some personal
information. The information required to continue with the
process was marked with an asterisk (name, surname, and
email), but the remaining information (gender, age, phone
number, address, zip code, city, region, and country) was
optional. This is the usual kind of information requested
in websites, which e-Commerce providers find useful for
sending targeted advertising. The secure option was to disclose
only the required information. Each of the eight non-
compulsory items increased the probability of suffering a
cyberattack. While the other four decisions reduced the
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risk of suffering a cyberattack, this measure went in the
opposite direction: the higher the value meant the participant
was behaving less securely. Therefore, when included in the
outcome measure cybersecure_behavior, the “sign-up” variable
was reversed. Admittedly, this variable had some limitations,
as the veracity of the information provided in these non-
compulsory items could not be guaranteed. In order to
preserve anonymity, the personal data disclosed by participants
was not recorded.
From the moment subjects registered until the end of the
purchasing process, the top right-hand side of the screen
displayed the text “Welcome” followed by their username, next
to which was a button to log out of the e-commerce website.
Decision 4: Choosing a Trusted Vendor
Once subjects had completed the registration process, they
had to select their choice of product (desktop wallpaper)
between four possible options. Each of the products displayed
a different picture, but the decision of choosing one of them
was not relevant for the study, as it did not involve any
secure or unsecure option. After that, participants had to choose
between two vendors. Both vendors offered the same product,
and were randomly ordered. The price offered by the first
vendor for the product was zero. In this case, the link to
download the product had no security signals (no image for
an e-trusted site). The simulated link for this supplier was
http (Hypertext Transfer Protocol). The second vendor offered
the product for €2, but the link to download it was of the
https (Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure) type and appeared
next to an image indicating it was an e-trusted site. Different
prices depending on the security of the provider reflected
how, in the real world, users can obtain products for free,
but possibly compromising their security. If the participants
chose the unsecured option (for free), they would increase the
probability of suffering a cyberattack.
Decision 5: Logging Out
Once subjects had completed the purchasing process, a new
screen displayed information about the cost of the purchased
product and the amount remaining on their credit cards. A new
button indicating “Next questionnaire” appeared at the bottom
right-hand side of this screen. However, the secure option was to
log out before continuing to the next questionnaire. Participants
were not told explicitly to log out, although they were asked to exit
the e-commerce website and complete the next questionnaire. If
they did not log out, their probability of suffering a cyberattack at
the end of the experiment increased.
RESULTS
In this section, we present the socio-demographic profile of
participants in the sample and the ANCOVA model that tested
the effect of the treatments, trust beliefs and knowledge on the
probability of suffering a cyberattack.
Sociodemographic Information of the
Sample
Quotas were applied by sex and age. Their value was fixed
according to the profile of the internet users provided by the
Annual Survey of Access and Usage of ICT in Households
and Individuals in 2013, where 51.7% of Internet users were
men and that 40.6% of the Internet users were under 35 years
of age. Age ranged between 19 and 69 years. Sixty percent
of participants were older than 32 and the mean age was
36.9 years. We provide further sociodemographic information
on the educational level and employment status of the
participants in Table 1.
Main Effects on the Probability of
Suffering a Cyberattack
The mean probability of suffering a cyberattack during the
experiment was higher in the gain-framed treatment (M = 33.16,
SD = 10.04) than in the loss-framed treatment (M = 28.43,
SD = 11.74; Figure 1). A two-tailed t-test comparing the
means of the probability of suffering a cyberattack between
the two treatments (gain vs. loss) showed a significant effect
[t(188) = 2.37, p = 0.019]. A post hoc analysis using jStat with
an alpha of 0.05 gave a power of 0.636. A loss-framed message
appeared to be more effective in generating secure behavior,
lending some support to Hypothesis 1.
We estimated a first regression model taking as dependent
variable the probability of suffering a cyberattack. The
explanatory variables were: (i) the treatments; (ii) cybersecurity
knowledge, trusting beliefs; and (iii) the interactions between the
treatments and the other explanatory variables. This first model
showed no significant results for the interactions between the
treatments and the other independent variables. In other words,
the effect of the gain vs. loss-framed messages did not depend on
cybersecurity knowledge or trusting beliefs.
TABLE 1 | Sociodemographic characteristics of participants1.
Education level %
No studies 0.83
Primary or lower secondary education 5.00
Upper secondary education and post-secondary, non-tertiary education 54.17
Bachelor’s degree or equivalent 31.67
Postgraduate degree 4.17
PhD 4.17
Employment status %
Self-employed 3.33
Employed by a public or private institution 33.33
Unemployed 24.17
Homemaker 1.67
Student 35.00
Disabled 0.00
Retired 2.50
1This table provides information on education level and employment status of
the sample. Further information on gender and age is included in the subsection
Sociodemographic Information of the Sample.
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FIGURE 1 | Box-plot of the probability of suffering a cyberattack by experimental group.
Table 2 provides the estimation of the final model. It
shows that the loss-framed message significantly decreased the
probability of cyberattack compared to the gain-framed message
[t(116) = −2.36, p-value = 0.020]. The estimated values of
the coefficients show that a loss-framed message reduces the
probability of suffering a cyberattack by 4.61%. This result
confirms support for Hypothesis 1.
Second, trusting beliefs had a significant effect on the
dependent variable [t(116) = 2.15, p-value = 0.034]. Participants
who placed higher levels of trust in the vendor showed less secure
behavior during the experiment. Hypothesis 2 is also supported.
Finally, knowledge of cybersecurity risks affected the
probability of suffering a cyberattack in an inverse relationship
(more knowledge meant less likelihood of an attack)
[t(116) =−2.13, p = 0.036]. Hypothesis 3 is also supported.
Tables 3–7 show participants’ behavior in each of the
five decisions they had to make during the experiment, by
experimental treatment. Regarding the first behavior (Table 3),
all subjects decided to choose a secure connection over the
unsecured one, no matter the framing of the message. Perhaps,
at this early stage of the process, all subjects were concerned with
navigating securely, as they had just read the security message
that appeared in the center of the screen. After closing the pop-
up, the message would only appear in the upper part of the screen
during the rest of the experiment.
The second decision was to choose a password (Table 4). As
mentioned before, password strength was measured according to
seven common security parameters. Each of the seven criteria
would increase the probability of suffering a cyberattack if not
met. Results show that subjects in the loss-framed message
condition met at least three of the seven criteria, and one
of them met all criteria. In the gain-framed condition, three
participants met fewer than three criteria and none of them met
the seven criteria.
Table 5 shows the quantity of information that subjects
provided during the sign-up process. There were eight
non-compulsory items included in the sign-up information.
Results show that 6.67% of subjects in the gain-framed condition
provided no information apart from the compulsory, compared
to 11.67% in the loss-framed condition.
The fourth decision was to choose between a trusted vs.
untrusted vendor (Table 6). Here, 30% of participants in the
TABLE 2 | Estimated coefficients of the final model for the probability of
suffering a cyberattack.
Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|)
Loss-framed1 −4.61 1.95 −2.36 0.020
Knowledge2 −3.41 1.60 −2.13 0.036
Trusting beliefs3 2.92 1.36 2.15 0.034
Cons −35.83 6.74 5.32 0.000
1The gain-framed condition was taken as baseline for the data analysis.
2The variable Knowledge was estimated as a mean of the values obtained in
each of the 10 items that comprised the Knowledge Scale. This scale is provided
in the Supplementary Table A2. Each of the items were measured in a 5-
point Likert scale.
3The variable Trusting beliefs was estimated as a mean of the values obtained
in each of the 10 items that comprised the Trusting Beliefs Scale. This scale is
provided in the Supplementary Table A1. Each of the items were measured in a
5-point Likert scale.
TABLE 3 | Decision 1 – choosing a secure connection by treatment1.
Treatment Connection security
Unsecured Secure Total
Gain-framed2 0 60 60
% 0 100.00 100.00
Loss-framed2 0 60 60
%3 0 100.00 100.00
Total 0 120 120
1Decision 1 was binary. It takes the value of 1 for choosing a secure connection,
and 0 for choosing an unsecure connection.
2Values for gain-framed and loss-framed are given in absolute terms.
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TABLE 4 | Decision 2 – choosing a strong password by treatment1.
Treatment Password strength [1–7]
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Total
Gain-
framed2
1 2 16 17 23 1 0 60
% 1.67 3.33 26.67 28.33 38.33 1.67 0.00 100.00
Loss-
framed2
0 0 16 20 17 6 1 60
% 0.00 0.00 26.67 33.33 28.33 10.00 1.67 100.00
Total 1 2 32 37 40 7 1 120
χ2(6, N = 120) = 8.7147 Pr = 0.190.
1Values for decision 2 ranged between 0 and 7 depending on the number of
criteria that participants met for password strength. All of the subjects met at
least 1 criteria.
2 Values for gain-framed and loss-framed are given in absolute terms.
TABLE 5 | Decision 3 – providing minimum information in the sign-up by
treatment1.
Treatment Information provided in the sign-up [1–8]
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Total
Gain-
framed2
4 1 5 2 0 1 5 3 39 60
% 6.67 1.67 8.33 3.33 0.00 1.67 8.33 5.00 65.00 100.00
Loss-
framed2
7 3 6 1 2 1 0 4 36 60
% 11.67 5.00 10.00 1.67 3.33 1.67 0.00 6.67 60.00 100.00
Total 11 4 3 2 2 2 5 7 75 120
χ2 (8, N = 120) = 9.5053 Pr = 0.301.
1Values for decision 3 ranged between 0 and 8 depending on the number
of non-compulsory cells that participants filled in when registering in the
e-commerce website.
2Values for gain-framed and loss-framed are given in absolute terms.
TABLE 6 | Decision 4 – choosing a trusted vendor by treatment1.
Treatment Trusted vendor
Untrusted Trusted Total
Gain-framed2 18 42 60
% 30.00 70.00 100.00
Loss-framed2 10 50 60
% 16.67 83.33 100.00
Total 28 92 120
χ2 (1, N = 120) = 2.981, p = 0.084.
1Decision 4 was binary. It takes the value of 1 for choosing a trusted vendor, and 0
for choosing an untrusted vendor.
2Values for gain-framed and loss-framed are given in absolute terms.
gain-framed treatment decided to choose the untrusted vendor,
compared to a 16.67% of subjects who visualized the loss-
framed message.
The last decision was to log-out or stay connected at the end of
the purchase process (Table 7). The amount of participants who
chose the secure option (i.e., logging-out) was a 15% higher in
the loss-framed condition than in the gain-framed one. Finally,
TABLE 7 | Decision 5 – logging out by treatment1.
Treatment Logging out
Stay connected Log out Total
Gain-framed2 48 12 60
% 80.00 20.00 100.00
Loss-framed2 39 21 60
% 65.00 35.00 100.00
Total 87 33 120
χ2 (1, N = 120) = 3.3856 Pr = 0.066
1Decision 5 was binary. It takes the value of 1 for logging-out after the purchase,
and 0 for staying connected.
2Values for gain-framed and loss-framed are given in absolute terms.
TABLE 8 | Estimated coefficients of the final model for cybersecure behavior.
Estimate Std. error t-value Pr(>|t|)
Loss-framed1 0.07 0.03 2.46 0.015
Knowledge2 0.05 0.03 2.16 0.033
Trusting beliefs3 −0.05 0.02 −2.24 0.027
Cons 0.50 0.11 4.59 0.000
1The gain-framed condition was taken as baseline for the data analysis.
2The variable Knowledge was estimated as a mean of the values obtained in
each of the 10 items that comprised the Knowledge Scale. This scale is provided
in the Supplementary Table A2. Each of the items were measured in a 5-
point Likert scale.
3The variable Trusting beliefs was estimated as a mean of the values obtained
in each of the 10 items that comprised the Trusting Beliefs Scale. This scale is
provided in the Supplementary Table A1. Each of the items were measured in a
5-point Likert scale.
although we found differences between both treatments in some
of the individual security-related decisions, none of them was
statistically significant.
Main Effects on Cybersecure Behavior
Table 8 provides the estimated coefficients of the model for the
dependent variable cybersecure_behavior. It shows that the loss-
framed message significantly increased cybersecure compared
to the gain-framed message [t(116) = 2.46, p-value = 0.015].
A post hoc analysis using jStat with an alpha of 0.05 gave a
power of 0.653. The estimated values of the coefficients show
that a loss-framed message increases cybersecure behavior, which
supports Hypothesis 1.
Trusting beliefs had also a significant effect on the dependent
variable [t(116) = −2.24, p-value = 0.027], which confirms
Hypothesis 2. Participants who placed higher levels of trust in the
vendor showed less secure behavior during the experiment.
Third, knowledge of cybersecurity risks influenced positively
cybersecure behavior, providing support for Hypothesis 3
[t(116) = 2.16, p-value = 0.033].
CONCLUSION
In this research, we examined the effect of security messages on
Internet users’ behavior during an online shopping process. Our
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first hypothesis was that, compared to gain-framed messages,
loss-framed messages would be more effective in ensuring
participants behaved securely during this process. The findings
support this hypothesis.
This paper then makes a contribution by extending work on
loss aversion bias, where individuals assign stronger values to
negative feelings than to positive ones (Kahneman and Tversky,
1979; Rozin and Royzman, 2001; Ert and Erev, 2008; Vaish
et al., 2008; McGraw et al., 2010), and shows its relevance to the
cybersecurity context.
A number of recent studies, including Junger et al. (2017),
suggest the presence of threat information can backfire if it takes
the form of a general warning, yet in our study threat or loss
information was effective. Two aspects of our loss-framing might
be relevant here.
Firstly, our loss message was tied explicitly to a financial loss
outcome (i.e., it did not simply cite some kind of general threat).
This means our result is in line with the idea that messages
focused on the negative consequences of non-compliance are
more persuasive (Cacioppo et al., 1997) when participants are
more involved, i.e., more motivated to change. In our case,
participants stood to lose money if they behaved insecurely and
so motivation (or involvement) was high (cf. de Graaf et al.,
2015). Our findings also demonstrate that the “loss looms larger”
message does apply to cybersecurity behavior and is not limited
to behavioral intentions [as with the Rosoff et al. (2013) study].
Secondly, our loss message was yoked to a behavioral nudge
to navigate safely (i.e., we told consumers what they needed to do
to avoid loss). Therefore, our intervention was aligned to recent
findings that show that threat (or loss) appeals in isolation fail, but
they can be effective when presented in conjunction with coping
messages that direct consumer behavior (van Bavel et al., 2019).
With regard to trusting beliefs, subjects who trusted the
vendor more performed worse on the experiment, meaning that
they made decisions that entailed more security risks, ending
with a higher probability of suffering a cyberattack. This result
supports our second hypothesis and ties in with the literature on
phishing and other forms of social engineering wherein trust in a
known vendor is explicitly used to overcome defensive behaviors
(Patrick et al., 2005). Consequently, trusting beliefs and their
influence on users’ performance as the weakest link in this wider
cybersecurity chain is an issue that should be further investigated.
It should not be surprising that trust is an issue in this
space. Firstly, we know that trust in an e-commerce vendor
not only increases click-through intention, but also decreases
malware risk perception (Ogbanufe and Kim, 2018). Secondly,
and more importantly, we have seen the “weaponisation” of
trust, with the huge rise in cybersecurity attacks that draw
on social engineering principles to create an illusion of trust.
Consumers are often led to believe that communication is with
a “trusted” party, when in fact some imitation of that trusted
party occurs (e.g., in phishing attacks). Trust, when exploited
in this way, has negative implications for both genuine vendors
and consumers and it is interesting to explore the kinds of
“nudges” that might make people less willing to trust in a
superficially familiar message or website (e.g., Moody et al., 2017;
Nicholson et al., 2017).
The results regarding the effect of knowledge about
cybersecurity support our third hypothesis. Subjects with a
higher level of agreement that the listed security actions would
prevent them from being attacked behaved more secure during
the experiment. We can extract from this that subjects who have a
clear concern of what secure behavior means may perform better
when making security decisions – a finding again in keeping with
recent work on the role of promoting “coping interventions” as
part of cybersecurity protection (e.g., Tsai et al., 2016; Jansen and
van Schaik, 2017; van Bavel et al., 2019).
Our findings from the questionnaire confirm that consumers’
trust makes them vulnerable and that knowing what secure
behavior is improves security decisions. Based on our
experimental findings, however, we would contend that a
fear-arousal behavioral component that describes a meaningful
loss, but that also describes the way to avoid that loss, could be
effective as a cybersecurity intervention.
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